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Abstract
Market power within a system of tradeable CO2-quotas leads to a non-optimal
distribution of abatement across countries. In this paper we introduce a quota system
that may reduce the adverse effects of market power, and thereby result in a
distribution of abatement across countries that is closer to a cost-effective outcome.
However, this system leads to a non-optimal distribution of abatement across periods.
Hence, we face a trade-off between a cost-effective distribution of abatement across
periods and reduced adverse effects of market power.
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21. Introduction
Tradeable quotas are often proposed as a policy instrument in an international
agreement to reduce emissions of CO2. Tradeable quotas will ensure a cost-effective
distribution of abatement if the market for quotas is competitive, which implies that
only price-taking countries operate in the market for quotas. In a tradeable quota
system, each country receives an initial amount of CO2-quotas, which can be traded. In
a competitive market for quotas it is optimal for all countries to sell (buy) quotas as
long as the market price of quotas is higher (smaller) than their own marginal
abatement cost since their emissions cannot exceed the total amount of quotas held by
the country. Furthermore, if each country could allocate the use of quotas freely across
periods, it is optimal for them to distribute abatement across periods such that their
present value of marginal abatement costs across periods are equalized.  In equilibrium,
marginal abatement costs are equalized across all countries and across all periods,
which is a cost-effective distribution of abatement.
The distribution of the economic burden of the climate agreement will be determined
by the initial allocation of quotas. As proven by Montgomery (1972), the cost-effective
distribution of abatement will be obtained regardless of the initial allocation of quotas
as long as the quota market is competitive. Hence, there is separability between
considerations of effectiveness and considerations of equity - any distribution of CO2-
quotas between countries could be achieved cost-effectively.
When we consider the share of the world’s CO2-emissions of different countries, it is
obvious that all countries cannot be considered as price-takers. The United States,
China and Russia had a share of the world’s CO2 emissions from industrial processes in
1992 of 22%, 12% and 9% respectively (World Resources Institute, 1996 (1992
figures). Those countries would probably trade a larger share of the total amount of
quotas than countries with lower share of world emissions, and could possibly exercise
market power in the market of tradeable quotas.
3It has long been established that market power within a static system of tradeable
quotas could result in inefficiencies. Hahn (1984) looks at a situation where there is
one agent with market power, while the rest of the traders are price-takers. He showed
that the efficiency loss from market power in such a market depends on the initial
allocation of quotas. Hence, there is no longer separability between considerations of
effectiveness and considerations of equity in the quota system. Westskog (1996)
estimates the efficiency loss from market power in a market for CO2-quotas for
different allocation rules. She shows that equity considerations or compensating
countries for joining an agreement of reducing CO2-emissions through quota
allocation, can result in significant efficiency losses in the market for quotas if some of
the participants exercise market power.
When countries exercise market power, a cost-effective solution could be achieved by
allocating quotas such that the initial allocation of quotas given to a country with
market power equals the number of quotas the country wants to have after quota
trading has taken place. However, burden sharing issues may set restrictions on how
quotas are allocated, and without separability between considerations of equity and
effectiveness, efficiency losses due to market power would arise. In this paper we
discuss how the design of the quota system can influence the efficiency loss from
market power when the distribution of quotas is restricted by equity considerations.1
We assume that some (or all) countries participate in a climate agreement where they
have agreed on a certain emission target that should be achieved during a period of
time. The period length is divided into sub-periods of equal length. The participating
countries have agreed on the initial distribution of quotas. We compare two different
systems for tradeable quotas in this paper:
1. A system where the quotas entitle the holder to emit a certain amount of CO2
                                               
1
 Equity considerations could also be taken care of by the use of side-payments. If equity
considerations are fully taken care of by the use of this kind of lump-sum transfers it possible to obtain
a cost-effective solution by allocating quotas such that no country exercises market power. In this
paper we consider a climate treaty where side-payments are not accepted as an instrument for burden-
sharing.
4 over the whole length of the period with no restrictions on the allocation of emissions
between the different sub-periods. Trade is arranged at the beginning of the period.
This system is referred to as a flexible quota system.
 
2. A system where there are restrictions on emissions in each sub-period. The quotas
entitle the holder to emit a certain amount of CO2 in each sub-period, and trade is
arranged at the beginning of each sub-period.  A quota bought in the first period has
a value for the holder in each of the following sub-periods. This is referred to as a
durable quota system.
A durable quota is comparable to a durable good. It is shown in the literature that
when a good is durable and sold by a monopolist in different periods, it is profitable for
the monopolist to lower the price in subsequent periods in order to sell additional
quotas (see for instance Tirole (1988) for a simple analysis of a durable good
monopoly). The buyers will expect that the monopolist will lower the price in future
periods in order to sell more quotas. These rational expectations hurt the monopolist
because the buyers are willing to pay less for quotas today, when they anticipate a fall
in the prices in the future. The monopolist’s incentive to sell additional units in each
sub-period in the durable quota system can reduce some of the efficiency loss from
market power compared to a flexible quota system. However, we will show that the
durable quota system could give rise to efficiency losses across periods due to a non-
optimal distribution of abatement across periods.
We will show that in a flexible quota system each country will distribute abatement
cost-effectively across periods. However, the difference in marginal abatement costs
across countries could be higher compared to a durable quota system. Hence, we face
a trade-off between a cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods and
reduced adverse effects of market power. The trade-off between these two effects is
the main topic of this paper.
In the next section we present a model for a durable quota system and a flexible quota
system. A comparison of the two quota systems is given in section 3. In section 4 we
carry out some numerical illustrations of the cost differences between the two systems
5by the use of the CO2-abatement cost functions taken from Bohm and Larsen (1994).
Concluding remarks are given in section 5.
2. The model
We consider a situation where some countries (or all countries) participate in a climate
treaty where they have agreed on a target level for their total emissions of CO2 during
a certain time period of T years. The emission target is denoted Q0. They have also
agreed on the initial distribution of quotas among the participating countries. One of
the countries exercises market power in the tradeable CO2 quota market. We will in
the following assume that this country is a large seller of quotas and is hereafter
referred to as the monopolist.2  All other countries are so small net buyers or sellers of
quotas that they can be considered as price-takers. These countries are referred to as
the fringe. In total, the fringe is a net buyer of quotas. Furthermore, we assume that
none of the countries act strategically in order to influence the outcome of a possible
renegotiation of the agreement after time T.
The time period of T years is divided in two equally long sub-periods, period 1 and
period 2.
 
Let t1 and t2 symbolize the beginning of period 1 and period 2, respectively.
The durable quota system has the following design:
The participants receive quotas at the beginning of period 1 and each quota specifies
an emission allowance in period 1 and in period 2. The quota can be characterized as a
durable quota - it lasts both periods. Trade is arranged at the beginning of each sub-
period. At time t1 the countries trade quotas that last for two periods. At time t2 the
countries trade quotas that only have a value for the holder for the remaining period
(period 2). The durable quota system might be designed such that the quotas give the
holder the right to emit different amounts of CO2 in the two periods. This implies that
a quota that specifies an amount of emissions equal to q  tons entitles the holder of the
6quota to emit (1+σ) q  tons in period 1 and (1-σ) ⋅q  tons in period 2, where -1 ≤
σ  ≤ 1.
The initial amount of quotas given to participant j in a durable quota system is denoted
qj0, j = M, F, where M is the monopolist and F is the fringe. The amount of  emission
allowances in period 1 (Q10), in period 2 (Q20) and the total emission allowances over
both periods (Q0) are thereby:
 
Q q q
Q q q
Q Q Q q q
M F
M F
M F
1
0 0 0
2
0 0 0
0
1
0
2
0 0 0
1 1
1 1
2 2
= + + +
= − + −
= + = ⋅ + ⋅
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
σ σ
σ σ  (1)
Note that since there is a target for total emissions it is not possible to let σ differ
between countries. If σ was country specific, total emissions achieved after trade in
quotas had taken place would depend on the outcome of the trade. We assume in
section 2.1 and 2.2 that σ is set to 0 which implies that the quotas give the holder the
right to emit the same quantity of CO2 in each sub-period. The impact of this
assumption will be discussed in section 3.
The flexible quota system has the following design:
In a flexible quota system the participant j receives quotas that specify the total amount
of emission allowances during both periods, which is denoted Qj0. The quotas are
traded once, at time t1. Each participant is free to decide the allocation of emissions
across periods as long as the total amount of emissions over both periods does not
exceed the total amount of quotas held by the participant. The total amount of quotas
allocated under this system, is:
                                                                                                                                      
2
 The general conclusions of this paper is, however, not affected whether we have a monopolist or a
monopsonist. This will be discussed in section 3 and 4. The impact of more than one large seller of
quotas will be discussed in the last section.
7Q Q QM F0 0 0= + .  (2)
In both a flexible quota system and a durable quota system the total amount of quotas
allocated to the participants during the time period T is Q0. To make comparisons
possible it is throughout the paper assumed that the initial distribution of the total
amount of emission allowances between the fringe and the monopolist during the two
periods, is identical in both systems:
Q q Q qM M F F0 0 0 02 2= ⋅ = ⋅ and (3)
Let C C (a)ji ji=  define the abatement cost function, where a is abatement, i denotes
the different sub-periods (i = 1,2) and j = M,F. The abatement cost functions are
increasing in the amount of emissions abated and convex ( ′ >C ji 0 , ′′ >C ji 0 ).
Abatement in country j in period i (aji) is the difference between business as usual
emissions ( Zji ) and the amount the country emits in that period ( uji ):
a Z uji ji ji= − (4)
In this paper we compare the durable and the flexible quota system when it comes to
the total costs of the two systems. The total cost of a tradeable CO2-quota system is
minimized (the system is cost-effective) when the present value of marginal abatement
costs for each period are equalized across countries and across periods. This implies
that:
∂
∂
∂
∂
C
a
C
a
i 1,2Fi
Fi
Mi
Mi
= = (5)
and
∂
∂ δ
∂
∂
C
a
C
a
j F, Mj1
j1
j2
j2
= = (6)
8where δ is the discount factor for period 2.
2.1 The durable quota system
The emissions in period 1 equal the initial amount of quotas a country holds for that
period, plus (minus) the amount of quotas bought (sold) in period 1. The abatement in
period 1 is therefore given by:
a Z q qF F F1 1
0
1= − +( ) (7)
a Z q qM M M1 1
0
1= − −( ) (8)
where q1 is the amount of quotas bought in period 1 by the fringe.
In period 2 a country’s emissions equal the initial amount of quotas a country holds for
that period plus (minus) the quotas the country bought (sold) in period 1, plus (minus)
the extra amount of quotas a country buys (sells) in period 2. The abatement in period
2 is given by:
a Z q q qF F F2 2
0
1 2= − + +( )  (9)
a Z q q qM M M2 2
0
1 2= − − −( ) (10)
where q2 is the amount of quotas bought in period 2 by the fringe.
We see from (7)- (10) that:
∂
∂
∂
∂
C
a
C
q
Fi
Fi
Fi
i
= − and ∂∂
∂
∂
C
a
C
q
Mi
Mi
Mi
i
= (11)
It follows from (7)-(10) that abatement in period 1 is a function of the business as
usual emission (Z) and the quotas bought/sold in period 1, while the abatement in
9period 2 is a function of the business as usual emission (Z) in that period and the
amount of quotas bought/sold in both periods.
The fringe’s marginal benefit of buying a quota in period 1 equals the present value of
the cost savings from not abating that amount of emissions in period 1 and in period 2.
The fringe’s demand for quotas in period 1 is affected by the possibility of buying
quotas in period 2 at a lower price. We assume that the fringe has perfect foresight
about the quota price in period 2. The price the fringe is willing to pay for one quota in
period 1 is equal to the marginal benefit of that quota in period 1 plus the present value
of the price of a quota in period 2. Therefore we have:
p C
a
p1 F1
F1
2= +
∂
∂ δ (12)
where p1 is the price of a quota in period 1 and p2 is the price of a quota in period 2.
This gives the following demand function for quotas in period 1: p1 = p q p1 1 2( , )
The fringe's demand for quotas in period 2 depends on the marginal benefit the fringe
obtains from buying a quota in that period:
p C
a
F
F
2
2
2
=
∂
∂
(13)
This gives the following demand function for quotas in period 2:   p2 = +p q q2 1 2( )
In period 2 the monopolist minimizes the costs of abatement in period 2 minus the
income from selling quotas, given the fringe's demand function for quotas in this
period:
{ }Min C (a ) p (q q ) q
q
M2 M2 2 1 2 2
2
− + ⋅ (14)
10
11
Solving (14) and inserting from (11) gives the following first order condition for the
monopolist’s cost minimization problem in period 2:
∂
∂
∂
∂
C
a
p (q q ) p
q
q      M2
M2
2 1 2
2
2
2= + + ⋅ (15)
which gives:
q = q2 2 ( )q1 (16)
It follows from (12), (13) and (16) that p1, p2 and q2 all are functions of the quotas
sold in period 1.
The monopolist’s optimization problem in period 1, given the fringe’s demand
functions for quotas, is given by:
[ ]{ }min
q1
C (a ) p (q ) q C (a ) p (q q (q )) q (q )M1 M1 1 1 1 M2 M2 2 1 2 1 2 1− ⋅ + − + ⋅δ (17)
Solving (17) and inserting from (11) and (15) gives the following first order condition:
∂
∂
∂
∂ δ
C
a
p p
q
q p      M1
M1
1
1
1
1 2= + ⋅ −  (18)
Let
q q1 1=
* (19)
be the solution to (18).
From (7) - (10), (12), (13), (16) and (19) we find the amount of abatement in the two
periods, the amount of quotas sold and the prices in period 1 and period 2 in the
durable quota system, which we denote a a a a q q p pF
DU
F
DU
M
DU
M
DU DU DU DU DU
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
* * * * * * * *
, , , , , , .and 3
                                               
3
 Superscript DU denotes the durable quota system.
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Since the durable quota system puts restrictions on emissions within each sub-period,
given by (1), a cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods, as expressed by
(6), is generally not ensured. Furthermore, we see from (12) and (18), and (13) and
(15) that the fringe’s marginal abatement cost is higher than the monopolist’s marginal
abatement cost in both sub-periods, which means that (5) is not satisfied. The durable
quota system does neither ensure cost-effectiveness across periods nor across
countries.
2.2  A flexible quota system
In a flexible quota system each country decides how to allocate abatement between the
two periods as long as total emissions do not exceed the total amount of quotas the
country holds. The fringe’s and the monopolist’s total abatements over both periods
are:
a a Z Z Q QF F F F F1 2 1 2 0+ = + − +( ) (20)
and
a a Z Z Q QM M M M F1 2 1 2 0+ = + − −( ) (21)
where Q is the total amount of quotas bought by the fringe.
The fringe will minimize the present value of the sum of the abatement costs in the two
periods and the costs of buying quotas, given that its total emissions do not exceed the
total amount of quotas hold. The fringe’s optimization problem is:
{ }Min C (a ) C (a ) P Q
a ,a ,Q F1 F1 F2 F2F1 F2
+ + ⋅δ (22)
subject to (20).
13
First order conditions of this minimization problem are:
∂
∂
δ ∂
∂
C
a
C
a
F
F
F
F
1
1
2
2
=  (23)
and
P C
a
F
F
=
∂
∂
1
1
,     i = 1,2 (24)
where P is the price of a quota in the flexible quota system.
Equation (23) states that the present value of the marginal abatement costs are
equalized across periods (for all Q). Equations (23) and (24) give the inverse demand
function for quotas (P(Q)).
The monopolist minimizes the present value of the sum of the abatement costs in the
two periods minus the income from selling quotas given that its total emissions do not
exceed the total amount of quotas hold, that is:
{ }Min C (a ) C (a ) P(Q) Q
a ,a ,Q
M1 M1 M2 M2
M1 M2
+ − ⋅δ (25)
subject to (21).
 This gives the following first order conditions:
∂
∂
δ ∂
∂
C
a
C
a
M
M
M
M
1
1
2
2
= (26)
and
∂
∂
∂
∂
P
Q Q + P =
C
a
    
M1
M1
⋅ (27)
From equation (20), (21), (23), (24), (26) and (27) we obtain the amount of abatement
in each period, the amount of quotas sold and the price of quotas in the flexible system
which we denote a a a a Q PFFL FFL MFL MFL1 2 1 2* * * * * *, , , , and .4
                                               
4
 Superscript FL denotes the flexible quota system.
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In a flexible quota system both the fringe and the monopolist will distribute abatement
cost-effectively across periods, as can be seen from (23) and (26). However, we see
from (24) and (27) that the fringe’s marginal abatement cost will exceed the marginal
abatement cost in the monopoly country in each period. The monopolist abates to little
compared to a cost-effective distribution of abatement across countries due to its
market power.
3. A comparison of the durable and the flexible quota system
In this section we compare the total cost of the two different systems of tradeable
quotas. The present value of the total cost of the flexible quota system, denoted TCFL,
is given by:
TC C (a ) C (a ) FL j1 j1FL* j2 j2FL*
j F,Mj F,M
= +
==
∑∑ δ (28)
The present value of the total cost of the durable quota system, denoted TCDU, is given
by:
TC C (a ) C (a ) DU j1 j1DU* j2 j2DU*
j F,Mj F,M
= +
==
∑∑ δ (29)
A cost-effective quota system implies that the present value of marginal abatement
costs for each period are equalized across countries and across periods, as expressed
by (5) and (6). We know from the previous section that in the flexible quota system
both the fringe and the monopolist distribute the abatement cost-effectively across
periods, but that the fringe’s marginal abatement cost exceeds the monopolist’s
marginal abatement cost in each sub-period. The monopolist sells too few quotas, and
hence abate too little, compared to a cost-effective distribution of abatement across
countries.
15
The deviation from a cost-effective distribution of abatement in the flexible quota
system depends on the initial allocation of quotas. From the discussion in section 1 we
know that the flexible quota system can result in a cost-effective distribution of
abatement if the initial distribution of quotas is such that the “potential monopolist”
finds it optimal to not sell any quotas. This means that the solution to the monopolist
maximizing problem given by (27) gives Q* equal to 0. It then follows from (23), (24),
(26) and (27) that the present value of marginal abatement costs for each period are
equalized across countries and across periods. This implies that the quota system is
cost-effective, as expressed  by (5) and (6). Hence, if the initial distribution of quotas
agreed on in the climate treaty, implies that Q* from (27) is zero, there is nothing to
gain by changing from a flexible quota system to a durable quota system. On the
contrary, the durable quota system will imply a higher total abatement cost, since that
system implies that abatement is not distributed cost-effectively across periods.
However, if the initial distribution of quotas agreed on in the climate treaty implies that
one of the countries acts as a monopolist in the quota market, the durable quota
system may lead to lower total abatement cost than the flexible quota system, in spite
of the non-optimal distribution of abatement over time. The reason for this is that a
durable quota system can increase the total amount of abatement carried out by the
monopolist, relative to the flexible quota system. In the flexible quota system, the
quotas are only sold once, at time t1. When deciding the optimal quantity of quotas
offered for sale, the monopolist takes into account that an increase in the amount of
quotas sold decreases the price on all units. However, in a durable quota system,
where quotas are sold at two dates, t1 and t2, the amount of quotas sold at t2 will not
affect the price of the quotas sold at t1. Those units are already sold, and once they are
sold the monopolist has no interest in maintaining the price on those quotas. It is
optimal for the monopolist to lower the quota price, that is, sell additional quotas, in
period 2.
.  
However, when the buyers correctly anticipate that the monopolist will
reduce the price in the second period, less will be bought at a high price in the first
period. In total this may lead to higher abatement in the monopolist country in the
durable quota system, than in the flexible quota system.
16
As we pointed out in the previous section, a durable quota system does not ensure that
abatement is distributed cost-effectively across periods within countries. Hence, more
abatement in the monopolist country relative to the flexible quota system is not
sufficient to ensure that the durable quota system is less costly than the flexible quota
system. The durable quota system is less costly than the flexible quota system if the
decrease in abatement cost due to higher abatement in the monopolist country is not
completely offset by increased abatement cost due to a non-optimal distribution of
abatement across periods.
Since the durable quota system puts restrictions on emissions within each sub-period,
changes in the abatement costs (C(a)) and changes in the business as usual emissions
(Z) over time will influence the cost of the durable quota system relative to the flexible
quota system.   
In order to make a further comparison of the two different quota systems we will first
ignore the effects of changes in the abatement costs and business as usual emissions
over time. (The impact of these changes will be discussed below.) Furthermore we
assume that the marginal abatement costs are linear.5
We ignore the effects of changes in abatement costs and business as usual emissions
over time by assuming that the present value of the abatement costs for each period do
not change over time, that is C (a) C (aj2 1 j1= δ ) , and that the business as usual emissions
are identical in both periods for both categories of countries, that is Zj1 =Zj2.6 These
assumptions ensure that the total abatement costs of the two systems are identical
before any trade of quotas has taken place.
Let the fringe’s abatement costs in period 1 and period 2 be given by:
                                               
5
 We have not been able to show the differences in total costs and abatements between a flexible and
durable system analytically with non-linear marginal abatement costs. We have, however, carried out
several numerical calculations on non-linear marginal cost functions without finding any cost
functions where the conclusions we draw from linear marginal abatement costs do not hold.
6
 Assuming C (a) C (aj2 1 j1= δ ) is formally identical to assuming that the abatement cost functions are
constant across periods if discounting is ignored, that is δ =1.
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C (a ) a ) F aF1 F1 F1 2 F1= ⋅ + ⋅
1
2
β ( (30)
and
C (a ) (a ) F aF2 F2 F2 2 F2= ⋅ + ⋅
1
2
1
δ β δ (31)
where δ is the discount factor and β and F are parameters in the abatement cost
functions.
Let the monopolist’s abatement costs in period 1 and period 2 be given by:
C (a ) (a ) M aM1 M1 M1 2 M1= ⋅ + ⋅
1
2
θ (32)
and
C (a ) (a ) M aM2 M2 M2 2 M2= ⋅ + ⋅
1
2
1
δ θ δ (33)
where δ is the discount factor and θ and M are parameters in the abatement cost
functions.
From (7) - (10), (12), (13), (16), (19), (20), (21), (23), (24), (26) and (27) we find that
the cost functions defined above give the following differences in abatement in the two
quota systems:
a a a a
K xF
DU
F
FL
M
DU
M
FL
1 1 1 1 2
* * * *( ) ( )− = − − =
−
+
ε ϕ
β (34)
a a a a
x
K xF
DU
F
FL
M
DU
M
FL
2 2 2 2
2
2
* * * *( ) ( )( )( )− = − − = −
− +
+
ε ϕ
β (35)
where
ε β
ϕ θ
θ
β
≡ + ≡ − =
≡ + ≡ − =
≡
≡ + +
( )
( )
a F where a Z q and q Q
a M where a Z q and q Q
x
K x x
F F F F F F
M M M M M M
0 0 0 0 1
2
0
0 0 0 0 1
2
0
25 4
(36)
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The difference in total costs of the two quota systems is given by:
TC TC x
K x
DU FL
− = −
− +
+
<
1
2
1
2
0
2
2
( ) ( )
( )
ε ϕ
β (37)
where TCFL and TCDU are defined by (28) and (29).
We see from the definitions in (36), that aj0 is the abatement in the flexible and durable
quota system for country j before any trade of quotas has taken place. ε and ϕ  are,
respectively, the fringe’s and monopolist’s per period marginal abatement cost before
trade occurs. We have assumed that the country which exercises market power is a
seller of quotas. A necessary condition for sale is that ε >ϕ.
We see from (34) and (35) that the durable quota system causes the fringe
(monopolist) to abate more (less) in period one and less (more) in period two
compared to the flexible quota system. Furthermore, we see that the fringe’s
(monopolist’s) total abatement over both periods is less (higher) in a durable quota
system that in the flexible quota system. The durable quota system induces a transfer of
abatement from the fringe to the monopolist compared to the flexible quota system. It
follows from (37) that the total cost of the durable quota system is lower than the total
cost of the flexible quota system. This means that the reduction in total cost due to
higher abatement in the monopolist country is not completely offset by the increased
cost due to a non-optimal distribution of abatement across periods.
Furthermore, we see from (37) that TCFL -TCDU (which is positive) is increasing in
(ε −ϕ) . It follows from the definition of ε  and ϕ, given by (36), that (ε −ϕ) is higher
the larger qM
0 compared to qF
0
. Increasing qM
0 relative to qF
0
 implies that the initial
distribution of quotas deviates more from the cost-effective distribution of emissions
(and hence abatement) across countries.
We have so far assumed that the country which exercises market power is a seller of
quotas. If  ε < ϕ, the country will buy quotas and hence be a monopsonist in the quota
market. However, we see from (37), that the difference in cost of the two systems is
independent on whether the country is a monopolist or a monopsonist.  Furthermore,
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we see from (37) that a higher initial allocation of quotas to a monopsonist decreases
the cost difference of the two quota systems since the absolute value of (ε−ϕ) is
smaller the larger qM
0 compared to qF
0
, when ε < ϕ. Increasing the initial allocation of
quotas to a monopsonist implies that the initial distribution of quotas deviates less from
the cost-effective distribution of abatement across countries.
This leads to the following conclusions if the marginal abatement costs are linear and
the present value of the abatement cost for each period and the business as usual
emissions do not change over time:
- The total abatement cost of a durable quota system is less than the total abatement
cost of a flexible quota system.
-The more the initial allocation of quotas deviates from a cost-effective distribution of
abatement across countries, the lower is the cost of the durable quota system
compared to the flexible quota system.
For all abatement cost functions, changes in the abatement costs and changes in the
business as usual emissions over time can increase the total cost of a durable quota
system compared to the flexible quota system due to the lack of ability to allocate
abatement optimally over time in the durable quota system. The more the restrictions
on emissions in each sub-period in the durable quota system differ from the optimal
distribution of abatement across periods, the higher is cet. par. the cost of the durable
quota system compared to a flexible quota system.
As argued above, the flexible quota system is cost-effective if the initial distribution of
quotes ensures that the “potential monopolist” finds it beneficial to not sell any quotas.
An initial distribution of quotas which implies that the monopolist exercises market
power will imply an efficiency loss because abatement is not distributed cost-effectively
across countries. The more the durable quota system through reduced market power,
reduces this efficiency loss, the lower is cet par. the cost of the durable quota system
compared to a flexible quota system.
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This leads to the following general conclusion:
-The difference in the total abatement costs between the durable and the flexible
quota system can be negative or positive depending on the monopolist’s market power
in the flexible quota system and the changes in abatement costs and business as usual
emissions over time.
We have so far assumed that the durable quota system specifies quotas which give the
holder the right to emit the same quantity of CO2 in each sub-period, that is σ in
equation (1) is set to 0. However, by setting σ≠0, some of the disadvantages of the
lack of flexibility of the durable quota system can be reduced. If, for instance, both the
fringe’s and the monopolist’s present value of abatement costs per period decrease
over time, the total cost of the durable quota system can be reduced by allowing higher
emissions in period 1 than in period 2, that is, 0 < σ  ≤ 1.
σ will have an impact on the trade in quotas since σ will influence fringe’s and
monopolist’s marginal abatement costs in both sub-periods. The σ that minimizes the
total cost is found by minimizing (29) with respect to σ where ajiDU*  will be a function
of σ . It is, however, in general not possible to completely remove the cost of a non-
optimal distribution of abatement across periods by choosing an optimal σ . The σ that
gives a cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods for the fringe will, in
general, differ from the σ that gives an optimal distribution of abatement across
periods for the monopolist. The reduction in the total cost of the durable quota system
of choosing an optimal σ compared to a situation where σ is set to 0, depends on the
changes in the monopolist’s and the fringe’s abatement costs and the business as usual
emissions over time and the difference in these changes between the two categories of
countries.
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4. Numerical Illustrations
To illustrate the difference in total costs of obtaining a certain target for a total
emissions reduction between a flexible and the durable quota system, we have carried
out some numerical calculations. We have used the cost functions of reducing CO2-
emissions from Bohm and Larsen (1994) which are based on a study by Nordhaus
(1991).7 Bohm and Larsen’s marginal cost functions fall into three categories separated
by the size of the carbon intensities in different countries. A country with a carbon
intensity equal to 0,26kg/USD is referred to as a reference country by Bohm and
Larsen, and makes one of these categories.  The two other categories of countries have
carbon intensities above and below this level. Countries with lower carbon intensities
than the reference country are supposed to have taken measures to reduce their carbon
intensities, and their marginal abatement costs are higher than that of the reference
country. The countries with higher carbon intensities than the reference country are
supposed to have the lowest marginal abatement costs of all the three categories of
countries. The cost and the marginal cost of reducing CO2-emissions are increasing
with the amount of CO2 abated ( ′ > ′′ >C a C aji ji ji ji( ) , ( )0 0 ) and C ji ( )0 0= .
As discussed in the introduction, several countries could possibly exercise market
power in the market of tradeable CO2-quotas, among them the United States, China
and Russia. In the numerical calculations carried out below, we consider a climate
treaty where the Western European countries and China are the participating countries.
China exercises monopoly power and faces a competitive fringe consisting of the
Western European countries.
According to the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
the developing country Parties of the convention shall not carry any of the costs of the
measures to combat climate change (see article 4.3). It is thus unlikely that China in the
near future is willing to participate in a climate treaty if this causes a financial loss.
However, China has a high carbon intensity, and hence low abatement cost. The total
                                               
7
 Detailed discussions of the cost functions are given in Bohm and Larsen (1994).
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cost of achieving a certain global goal for emissions reductions could therefore be
significantly reduced if China would join the treaty. It can therefore be beneficial for
the Western-Countries to compensate China for joining the treaty. One way of
compensating China is through the initial allocation of quotas. The higher initial
allocation of quotas that China receives, the more beneficial is it for China to join the
treaty.
China has a carbon intensity of 1.6 kg/USD (World Resources, 1992 (1989 figures)),
and falls in the category of countries with carbon intensities above that of the reference
country (0,26kg/USD). It has the following marginal abatement cost function:
′ = − −
−
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( ) ,2 ln ( $)185 1 2 (38)
where eM is the carbon intensity of China, and ê is the reference country's carbon
intensity.
To simplify we have used average values of carbon intensities and business as usual
emissions in the Western-European countries to obtain one single abatement cost
function. The Western-European countries (the fringe) have an average carbon
intensity of 0.15kg/USD (Bohm and Larsen 1994, Table Ι). Their marginal cost
function is as follows:
′ = − −
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e
e
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Fi F
( ) ,2 ln $185 1 (39)
where eF is the fringe’s carbon intensity.
We assume that eM, eF and ê do not change over time.
We have carried out the calculations under different assumptions of changes in
business as usual emissions and different quota allocation systems. Opposed to the cost
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functions of the previous section (given by (30)-(33)) changes in business as usual
emissions in the above marginal cost functions (given by (38) and (39)) will directly
influence abatement costs since abatement costs are a function of relative abatement.
The period length is ten years starting in year 2005 and divided into two equally long
sub-periods of 5 years. We have based our emission scenarios on the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) scenarios for greenhouse gas
emissions (see IPCC 1996). The IPCC has developed six emission scenarios based on
assumptions concerning population and economic growth, land use, technological
changes, energy availability and fuel mix over the period 1990 to 2100.8 In our
calculations of the changes in business as usual emissions of CO2 we have used three of
these scenarios, IS92a, IS92c and IS92e.9
• Business as usual emissions change in line with the IS92a scenario. It implies a 15%
and 1.8 % increase in the business as usual emissions from period 1 to period 2 in
China and the Western-European countries, respectively.
• Business as usual emissions change in line with IS92c scenario, which implies a 7%
increase and a 1.5% decrease in business as usual emissions from period 1 to period
2 in China and the Western-European countries, respectively.
• Business as usual emissions change in line with the IS92e scenario. It implies a 17%
and a 4% increase from period 1 to period 2 in business as usual emissions in China
and Western-European countries, respectively.
 
We have considered two different allocation rules. With the first allocation rule each
country including China, receives quotas corresponding to 80 per cent of their business
as usual emissions (BaU emissions). With the second allocation rule China receives
quotas equal to its business as usual emissions and the Western-European countries
receive quotas equal to business as usual emissions minus the target for emission (Q0)
(this allocation rule is called the special allocation rule). The latter allocation rule is an
                                               
8
 See Pepper et al. (1992) for a detailed description of the distribution of emissions across countries
following from the different scenarios.
9
 The IS92c and IS92e assume the lowest and the highest CO2-emissions respectively of the six
scenarios in the report. The IS92a scenario is a mid-range scenario.
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example of an allocation rule where China demands a high financial benefit in order to
join the treaty.10
For both allocation rules we have calculated the total cost of the durable quota system
with σ=0, and the total cost with an optimal σ (the impact of choosing an optimal σ
has been discussed in the previous section).11 The discount rate per year is 5%. This
implies a discount factor (δ) of 0.78 for period 2. The results of the numerical
calculations are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. The relative difference in total costs of the durable quota system
compared to the flexible quota system.12
 
   Allocation rule: 80% of BAU   Allocation rule: Special all.rule
Changes in costs from 
period 1 to period 2
Durable system 
with σ =0
Durable system 
with an optimal σ 
Durable system  
with σ=0
Durable system 
with an optimal σ 
BaU changes in line 
with the IS92a 
scenario -0.31% -0.36% -5.55% -5.64%
BaU changes in line 
with the IS92c 
scenario 0.36% -1.23% -4.42% -8.59%
BaU changes in line 
with the IS92e 
scenario -0.17% -0.26% -6.30% -7.21%
The numerical calculations illustrate the following:
- For all the calculations except one, the durable quota system gives lower total cost
than the flexible quota system. The gain from equalized marginal abatement costs
                                               
10
 The special allocation rule will more than offset what China needs to get compensated for its costs
of reducing emissions (if they find it beneficial to sell any quotas). Although extreme, this allocation
rule shows the effects of allocating more quotas to the monopoly country.
11
 Choosing an optimal σ implies that σ is endogenous in the calculations.
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across periods in the flexible system, does not offset the gain from reduced effects of
market power in the durable system. However, in the IS92c scenario with σ=0 and
where the countries receive quotas corresponding to 80% of their business as usual
emissions, the flexible quota system gives lower total costs than the durable quota
system. In this case the gain from reduced effects of market power in the durable quota
system is offset by the gain from equalized marginal abatement costs across periods in
the flexible quota system.
- The introduction of an optimal σ in a durable quota system implies that marginal
abatement costs across periods could be closer to the cost-effective solution compared
to setting σ=0. Hence, the advantage of the durable quota system compared to the
flexible quota system is increased. In our calculations the durable quota system with an
optimal σ gives lower total cost than the flexible quota system for all the scenarios
considered. As argued in the previous section, differences in the changes of business as
usual emissions between countries implies that an optimal σ for one country is different
from an optimal σ for the other. Hence, with differences in the changes in the business
as usual emissions between countries we are not ensured that a common σ leads to
lower total costs of the durable quota system than the flexible quota system. For all the
scenarios considered in our calculations these differences are, however, not of such a
magnitude that a common σ does not result in lower total cost of the durable quota
system compared to the flexible quota system.
-The chosen allocation rule influences the advantage of the durable quota system
compared to the flexible quota system. When quotas are allocated according to the
special allocation rule, the cost of the durable quota system relatively to the flexible
quota system is significantly decreased compared to an allocation of quotas in
percentage of business as usual emissions. A higher initial allocation of quotas to the
monopolist (monopsonist) as an allocation of quotas according to the special allocation
rule will imply, increases (decreases) the deviation from a cost-effective distribution of
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 The relative difference is computed in the following way: TC TC
TC
DU FL
FL
−
. The durable quota
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abatement across countries. This implies decreased (increased) cost of the durable
quota system compared to the flexible quota system. Hence, if the monopolist
(monopsonist) is compensated for joining an agreement through quota allocation, the
advantage of the durable quota system compared to the flexible quota system is
increased (decreased).
 
5. Concluding remarks.
When countries act strategically in the tradeable quota market there is no longer
separability between considerations of effectiveness and considerations of equity, as
would be the case in a competitive market for quotas. In this paper we have examined
how the design of the quota system could reduce the efficiency loss from market
power when the distribution of CO2-quotas is restricted by equity considerations.  We
have compared two different tradeable quota systems - a durable quota system and a
flexible quota system. A durable quota system can reduce the adverse effects of market
power. However, it sets restrictions on the sum of emissions from the fringe and the
monopolist in each sub period. This implies that a durable quota system does not
ensure an optimal distribution of abatement across periods. In a flexible quota system
we obtain an optimal distribution of abatement across periods. However, due to the
monopolist’s market power the difference in marginal abatement costs across countries
could be higher compared to a durable quota system. Hence, we face a trade-off
between a cost-effective distribution of abatement across periods and reduced adverse
effects of market power. The durable quota system is less costly than the flexible quota
system if the decrease in abatement cost due to higher abatement in the monopolist
country is not completely offset by increased cost due to a non-optimal distribution of
abatement across periods.
We have shown that if the present value of abatement costs for each period do not
change over time, business as usual emissions remain unchanged and marginal
abatement costs are linear:
                                                                                                                                      
system is less costly than the flexible quota system when the relative difference is negative.
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• The total abatement cost of a durable quota system is less than the total abatement
cost of a flexible quota system.
• The more the initial allocation of quotas deviates from a cost-effective distribution
of abatement across countries, the lower is the cost of the durable quota system
compared to the flexible quota system.
In general, changes in abatement costs and changes in the business as usual emissions
over time can increase the total cost of a durable quota system compared to a flexible
quota system. As a result the difference in total abatement costs between the durable
and the flexible quota system can turn out to be both negative or positive depending on
the monopolist’s market power in the flexible quota system and the changes in
abatement costs and business as usual emissions over time.
In the last part of the paper we have carried out numerical calculations of the cost
differences between the durable and the flexible quota system. They are carried out
with increasing and convex cost functions, and clearly illustrate that the advantage of
the durable quota system compared to the flexible quota system depends on the chosen
allocation rule. With the use of the special allocation rule, which implies that the
monopoly country receives quotas equal to its business as usual emissions, the
advantage of durable quota system is increased considerably compared to an allocation
rule where countries receive quotas equal to 80 per cent of their business as usual
emissions.
We have assumed that the participants only trade quotas at time t1 and t2. Coase
(1972) conjectured and Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) showed formally that a
durable monopolist that produces an infinitely durable good must always charge the
competitive price as the time between offers approaches zero. Why could we not
design the durable quota system in such a way that quotas are offered arbitrarily
frequently to make the market power vanish, and reach the competitive outcome? The
monitoring costs prevent this. Monitoring that emissions are in compliance with the
total amount of quotas held would also have to be done arbitrarily frequently. Apart
from the practical problems of carrying out such an intensive control (which most
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likely would be impossible to carry out), the costs of doing it would also be enormous.
Therefore, what Coase conjectured is not possible to achieve in a durable quota
system. Market power can be reduced by making the quotas durable, but it cannot be
reduced to zero. It is impossible to make the period length arbitrarily small.
We have only considered one large seller. Gul (1987) and Ausubel and Deneckere
(1987) show that letting the firms in a durable goods oligopoly make offers arbitrarily
frequently with infinite durability enhances their ability to commit to high prices, and in
the limit when the period length approaches zero, enables them to enjoy total market
profit equal to the full commitment monopoly profit. There could obviously be
possibilities for several agents with market power in a tradeable quota system.
However, the results of Gul (1987) and Ausubel and Deneckere (1987) rely on infinite
durability and arbitrarily frequent offers. As discussed above arbitrarily frequent offers
are impossible in a durable quota system because of monitoring costs, but in addition
their results are no longer valid in a finite horizon game as the one we study. It is a
well-known result from the literature of game theory that it is possible to sustain a tacit
collusion in an infinite repeated game. However, in a finite horizon game it would be
profitable for the oligopolist to sell/ buy quotas at a lower price than the oligopoly
price in the last period. The other oligopolists and the consumers know this. The
commitment is no longer credible. By use of backward induction, we end up in a
situation where the market power of the oligopolists is reduced as under durable good
monopoly.
It can be argued that if we design the system such that there are only price-taking
traders operating in the market of tradeable quotas, the problem discussed in this paper
would disappear. Why not let each producer and importer of fossil fuels to a country
operate in the tradeable quota market rather than countries? There are several reasons
why this would not make the market competitive. First, many of the importers and the
producers of fossil fuels would probably have the possibility of acting strategically in
the quota market as well. Many of them have large market shares. The market power
problem could be reduced, but it would probably not disappear. Second, if a country
has the ability to act strategically when countries are traders in the quota market, it can
still act strategically if its importers and producers of fossil fuels are traders of quotas.
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By introducing national taxes on fossil fuels it can affect the supply or demand of
quotas in the international market of tradeable CO2-quotas, and hence be able to
exercise market power as before.
In the literature of durable goods it is shown that the durable quota monopolist could
escape the "trap" of durability by leasing the quotas and enjoy the full effects of market
power. (See for instance Coase (1972) for a discussion of this issue.) To avoid this the
durable quota system has to be designed in such a way that leasing is not possible. If a
quota exchange for tradeable durable quotas is established, and only the traded quotas
on the exchange are approved by a control commission in the monitoring of emissions,
we cannot see that a leasing market would arise.  It will not be profitable to lease a
quota outside the exchange system since a leased quota not approved by the
commission, has no value for the holder.
30
References
Ausubel, L.M. and R.J. Deneckere (1987), One is almost enough for Monopoly, Rand Journal of
Economics 18, 255-274.
Bohm, P. and B. Larsen (1994), Fairness in a Tradeable-permit Treaty for Carbon Emissions
Reductions in Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Environmental and Resource Economics
4, No. 3.
Coase R. H. (1972), Durability and Monopoly, Journal of Law and Economics 15, 143-149.
Hahn, R. W. (1984), Market Power and Transferable Property Rights, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 99, 753-765.
Gul, F. (1987), Noncooperative Collusion in a Durable Goods Oligopoly, Rand Journal of Economics
18, 248-254.
Gul, F., H. Sonnenschein and R. Wilson (1986), Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase
Conjecture, Journal of Economic Theory 39, 155-190.
IPCC (1996), Climate Change 1995 - Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate Change:
Scientific-Technical Analyses, Contribution of Working Group II to the Second Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, R.T. Watson, M.C. Zinyowera and
R.H. Moss (Eds.), Cambridge University Press.
Pepper W., J. Leggett, R. Swart, J. Wasson, J. Edmonds and I. Mintzer (1992), Emission Scenarios
for the IPCC. An Update, Prepared by for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Working Group 1.
Mongomery, D.W. (1972), Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, Journal of
Economic Theory 5, 395-418.
Nordhaus, W.D. (1991), The Cost of Slowing Climate Change: a Survey, The Energy Journal 12, 37-
65.
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press.
Westskog, H. (1996), Market Power in a System of Tradeable CO2-quotas, The Energy Journal 17,
85-103.
World Resource Institute (1992), World Resources 1992-1993, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
World Resource Institute (1996), World Resources 1996-1997, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
CICERO was established by the
Norwegian government in April
1990 as a non-profit organization
associated with the University of
Oslo.
The research concentrates on:
• International negotiations on
climate agreements. The themes
of the negotiations are
distribution of costs and benefits,
information and institutions.
• Global climate and regional
environment effects in
developing and industrialized
countries. Integrated assessments
include sustainable energy use
and production, and optimal
environmental and resource
management.
• Indirect effects of emissions and
feedback mechanisms in the
climate system as a result of
chemical processes in the
atmosphere.
This is CICERO
Contact details:
CICERO
P.O. Box. 1129 Blindern
N-0317 OSLO
NORWAY
Telephone: +47 22 85 87 50
Fax: +47 22 85 87 51
Web: www.cicero.uio.no
E-mail: admin@cicero.uio.no
